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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
MEASURES TO INCREASE 
APPELLATE COURT EFFICIENCY 
AND DECISION OUTPUTt 
Thomas B. Marvell* and Carlisle E. Moody** 
Appellate court caseloads have increased greatly since World 
War II, doubling approximately every ten years.1 Because states 
created appellate judgeships only one-third as fast as caseloads 
grew,2 the judges have faced heavy demands to increase produc-
tivity. Most state appellate courts successfully expanded deci-
sion output to match the appeals "explosion"; decision growth 
averaged 116% over the ten-year period from 1974 to 1984, only 
slightly less than the 123 % growth for filings over the corre-
sponding period. 3 Output per judge increased, on average, from 
fifty-three to eighty-eight decisions in the 1974-1984 period for 
the forty-five states with available information.' 
The plight of the appellate courts has resulted in an enormous 
body of literature recommending procedures for increasing judi-
cial resources and judicial productivity.11 The literature, however, 
t This research was supported by Grant 83-IJ-CX-4046 given by the National 
Institute of Justice to Court Studies, Inc. The contents do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the Institute. 
* Court Studies, Inc., Williamsburg, Virginia. B.A., Harvard, 1961; J.D., University of 
Michigan, 1964; Ph.D. (sociology), University of Michigan, 1976. 
** Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. 
B.A., Colby College, 1965; Ph.D. (economics), University of Connecticut, 1970. 
1. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BULLETIN: 1973-83 
TRENDS, THE GROWTH OF APPEALS 2 (1985) (discussing increase in appellate caseload over 
recent 10-year period); Marvell, Appellate Court Caseloads: Historical Trends, 4 APPEL-
LATE CT. ADMIN. REV. 3 (1983). Research in progress by the authors, however, suggests 
that appellate filing growth slowed greatly during the mid-1980's, especially in civil cases. 
This trend was forecast, id. at 7, because civil caseload trends tend to follow economic 
trends, and the nation experienced recessions in 1980 and 1982. 
2. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 3. 
3. Marvell, State Appellate Court Responses to Caseload Growth, 72 JUDICATURE 
(1988) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Responses to Caseload Growth]. This is based on 39 
states' filings for the 10 years from 1973 to 1983 and decisions for the 10 years from 1974 
to 1984. Decisions lag a year because courts take about a year to decide appeals. "Deci-
sions" and "filings" are defined infra note 42 and text accompanying 56. 
4. Responses to Caseload Growth, supra note 3. 
5. See generally AMERICAN BAR Ass'N TASK FORCE ON APPELLATE PROCEDURE, EFFI-
CIENCY AND JUSTICE IN APPEALS: METHODS AND SELECTED MATERIALS (1977); P. CAR· 
RINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976); COMMISSION ON STAN-
415 
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has not provided more than educated guesses about which pro-
cedures work best. This Article attempts to fill this void by eval-
uating the changes that state appellate courts have made to in-
crease decision output. The changes fall into seven categories: 
(1) adding judges or temporarily assigning trial and retired 
judges; (2) hiring law clerks and staff attorneys; (3) curtailing 
opinion practices by deciding cases with unpublished opinions, 
with unsigned opinions, or without opinions; (4) creating or ex-
panding intermediate courts; (5) reducing the nu~ber of judges 
who participate in each decision; (6) curtailing oral arguments; 
and (7) using summary judgment procedures. These categories 
encompass virtually all of the major changes that appellate 
courts have made to increase productivity in the past two de-
cades. 6 Although questions of productivity and efficiency are 
never the sole criteria for determining how appellate courts 
should adapt to rising caseloads, knowledge about which changes 
actually do increase productivity and efficiency, and by how 
much, should be valuable information when making such 
decisions. 
This Article will examine the effectiveness of measures com-
monly employed to increase appellate court productivity. Part I 
of the Article sets forth some common design problems and ex-
plains how the research technique employed in the present 
study avoids these problems by using a multiple time-series re-
search design. Part II applies this design to state court data. 
Part II also describes the dependent variable, the number of ap-
peals decided per judge, used in the regression analysis. Part III 
discusses the results of that analysis-the impact of each change 
listed above on judicial productivity. The Article, although not 
advocating the adoption of the discussed efficiency measures, 
concludes that the failure to enact any type of efficiency mea-
sure will cause appellate courts to fall behind in the handling of 
their caseloads. 
DARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS 
(1977); R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS (1976); T. 
MARVELL, BIBLIOGRAPHY: STATE APPELLATE COURT ADAPTATION TO CASELOAD AND DELAY 
PROBLEMS (1985); T. MARVELL, BIBLIOGRAPHY: STATE APPELLATE COURT WORKLOAD AND 
DELAY (1979); D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOL· 
UME (1974); Marvell, Appellate Capacity and Caseload Growth, 16 AKRON L. REV. 43 
(1982). 
6. See infra note 45. 
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Empirical research requires good research design. In the same 
manner that a building cannot be trusted if its structural design 
is substandard, research findings lack credibility if the research 
design is faulty. The empirical study of courts, however, differs 
from building construction in that researchers frequently ignore 
the generally accepted design standards. As a result, judges and 
others should not rely on the conclusions of most court research. 
The major difficulty in empirical research is differentiating the 
impact of numerous factors that affect the studied variables. 
The present research, evaluating changes made in appellate 
courts, provides a good illustration. One cannot easily distin-
guish the impact of any one particular change, such as adding 
staff attorneys, from the impact of other innovations designed to 
improve efficiency and from the impact of numerous other de-
velopments in the courts. Most appellate courts have taken mul-
tiple procedural and structural steps to increase productivity. 
Further, these steps are not one-shot, discrete events; rather, the 
courts regularly expand the use of particular innovations. For 
example, courts typically increase attorney staffs incrementally, 
and they usually phase in new efficiency programs-such as re-
ducing opinion publication-over several years. Courts, more-
over, sometimes reverse or eliminate such steps, especially when 
new judgeships are created. 
Productivity is also affected by innumerable events other than 
the changes designed to improve operations. The most impor-
tant, as will be explained later, is the volume of filings. Judge 
turnover and changes in composition of caseloads may also be 
important. Furthermore, caseload volume can indirectly cause 
courts to adopt procedures designed to stimulate out-
put-reciprocal causation. In sum, there is a tangled mass of 
forces operating in each court, and an acceptable research design 
must present a credible mechanism for distinguishing the im-
pact of particular forces. 
A large volume of literature exists that specifies which re-
search designs are acceptable for distinguishing between causal 
factors. 7 Still, commentators criticize research on the courts and 
7. See generally D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL 
DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963); T. COOK & D. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN 
& ANALYSIS FOR FIELD SETTINGS (1979). For law and society research, see J. MONAHAN & 
L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW (1985); Lempert, Strategies of Research Design in 
the Legal Impact Study: The Control of Plausible Rival Hypotheses, 1 LAW & Soc'y 
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other aspects of the justice system for using poor research de-
signs. 8 Researchers in this area, in fact, generally ignore the ac-
cumulated social science knowledge about how to conduct re-
search: They seldom ref er to, or otherwise base their methods 
on, methodological texts or other authorities, and they infre-
quently warn readers that research design problems render the 
results uncertain. From the social science perspective, these 
omissions are tantamount to professional malpractice. The re-
sult is the application of Gresham's law: "Bad research so turns 
off decision makers that good research is largely ignored. "9 
A. Unacceptable Research Designs 
Two research designs that social science methodological writ-
ings single out as inadequate are the before-and-after design and 
the cross-section design. Nevertheless, court researchers fre-
quently use these designs. 
1. The before-and-after design- Perhaps the most common, 
and worst, design for evaluating changes in courts simply com-
pares the situation in the years before the change to the situa-
tion in the years after. To study the impact of adding staff attor-
neys, for example, the before-and-after design compares the 
number of cases decided per judge in one or a few years before 
hiring the staff to the number of cases decided per judge during 
the following few years. Such studies are virtually useless for 
several reasons. 
The first and most obvious problem is that other factors may 
have caused any increase or decrease in decision output mea-
sured. For instance, one cannot determine whether the staff at-
torneys had an effect unless one concludes that all other likely 
factors are known, and that they did not influence the results. 
Such conclusions are rarely justified. 
REV. 111 (1966); Lind, Shapard & Cecil, Methods for Empirical Evaluation of Innova-
tions in the Justice System, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMM. ON EXPERI-
MENTATION IN THE LAW, EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW 85-121 (1981); Luskin, Building a 
Theory of Case-Processing Time, 62 JUDICATURE 114 (1978). 
~ 8. A major review of federally funded criminal justice research, including court re-
search, concluded that the quality of such research was predominantly mediocre, mainly 
because of poor research designs. COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
CRIMINAL JUST., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING CRIME: AN EVALUATION OF THE 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 65-71, 92-96 (1977). 
See also Luskin, supra note 7. 
9. Johnson, Misuses of Applied Social Research, in THE UsE/NONUSE/MISUSE OF AP-
PLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN COURTS 39, 41 (M. Saks & C. Baron eds. 1980). 
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A good example of this type of problem appeared in an evalu-
ation of an Arizona program designed to reduce delays by using 
volunteer lawyers as temporary judges. Division One of the Ari-
zona Court of Appeals used a large number of lawyer-judges 
from late 1984 until mid-1986, such that the court was able to 
increase the effective number of judges by nearly twenty per-
cent.10 A study of the program11 found that the time to decision 
declined substantially in 1985 and 1986, and it attributed this 
change to the lawyer-judges, as well as to increased efforts by 
the regular judges.12 The delay reduction, however, may have 
had other causes. After several years of sharp increases, civil ap-
peals coincidentally declined when the program began,13 and an-
other division of the court absorbed much of Division One's 
caseload, further reducing caseload pressure.14 Such major re-
ductions in caseloads and backlogs provide an explanation for 
the delay reduction that is at least as likely as the use of lawyer-
judges. Other changes that may have contributed to the delay 
reduction include the declining use of full opinions in favor of 
shorter unpublished "memorandum" opinions111 and the addition 
of a second law clerk for most judges in 1985.16 
10. A. AIKMAN, M. ELSNER & F. MILLER, FRIENDS OF THE COURT: LAWYERS AS SUPPLE-
MENTAL JUDICIAL RESOURCES 84-111 (1987). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 98, 106-07. 
13. Attorneys filed 537 civil appeals in 1980, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, 
THE ARIZONA COURTS: 1982 ANNUAL JUDICIAL REPORT 17 (1983) [hereinafter 1982 JUDI-
CIAL REPORT], 605 in 1984, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE ARIZONA COURTS 
1984 JUDICIAL REPORT 7 (1985) [hereinafter 1984 JUDICIAL REPORT], 598 in 1985, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE ARIZONA COURTS: 1985 JUDICIAL REPORT 12 (1986) 
[hereinafter 1985 JUDICIAL REPORT], and 563 in 1986, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
COURTS, THE ARIZONA COURTS: 1986 JUDICIAL REPORT 15 (1987) [hereinafter 1986 JUDI-
CIAL REPORT]. A. AIKMAN, M. ELSNER & F. MILLER, supra note 10, at 85, erroneously show 
a five-percent increase in 1985. 
14. See, e.g., 1985 JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 12-13. Arizona's second inter-
mediate court, Division Two, grew from three to six judges in early 1985. Id. at 13. Divi-
sion One's backlog of civil appeals was significantly reduced by transferring a large num-
ber of cases from Division One to Division Two. In 1985, there was a net transfer, out of 
Division One, of 52 cases. Fifty of these cases were transferred to Division Two. Id. at 12-
13. In 1986, a net 137 cases were transferred out of Division One, and 134 net cases were 
transferred into Division Two. 1986 JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 15-16. 
15. The court reports show that full opinions declined from 30% of civil decisions in 
1984, 1984 JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 7, to 19% in 1985, 1985 JUDICIAL REPORT, 
supra note 13, at 12, and 25% in 1986, 1986 JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 15. 
16. In 1983, there were 16 law clerks for the 15 judges in both divisions. ADMINISTRA-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE ARIZONA COURTS: 1983 CASELOAD, FINANCIAL, AND PER-
SONNEL REPORT (1984). In 1984, there were 21 clerks for 15 judges. ADMINISTRATIVE OF-
FICE OF THE COURTS, THE ARIZONA COURTS: 1984 CASELOAD, FINANCIAL, AND PERSONNEL 
REPORT (1985). In 1985, there were 31 clerks for 18 judges. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
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The before-and-after design also cannot distinguish the effects 
of innovations from "secular drift," a general long-term trend. 
Appellate caseloads increased regularly for several decades until 
the mid-1980's, prompting courts to dispose of more appeals ir-
respective of any procedural or personnel changes. Thus, a 
before-and-after study usually shows that an innovation works.17 
Researchers often compare one measure taken before the in-
novation to a different measure taken afterwards. For example, a 
study of summary procedures in the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court concluded that new summary procedures are efficient 
largely because the average delay in cases subjected to the pro-
cedures was less than the delay for all criminal cases in the 
prior year. 18 A frequent mistake is to measure delay in cases 
filed before and after an innovation, but to exclude cases still 
pending at the time researchers wish to conclude the research. 
The pending cases are predominately those filed after the inno-
vations and those with the longest delay, so the sample of cases 
for the "after" period is skewed because it includes only the 
cases with less delay.19 
A final problem is that the innovation may not have an imme-
diate impact because it may take some time for judges and staff 
to overcome the inertia of the old standard operating procedures 
and to iron out the bugs in the new procedures. 20 Therefore, the 
usual procedure of only measuring output soon after the experi-
ment is initiated is not sufficient. 
2. Cross-section studies- A second unacceptable design is 
the cross-section survey. For instance, a researcher might study 
THE COURTS, THE ARIZONA COURTS: 1985 CASELOAD, FINANCIAL, AND PERSONNEL REPORT 
(1985). 
17. See, e.g., J. LUCAS, THE APPELLATE PROCESS AND STAFF RESEARCH ATIORNEYS IN 
THE ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT 73-84 (1974). In that study, the researcher concluded that 
staff attorneys helped courts increase the number of cases decided, because the number 
went up in the year staff attorneys were introduced. Id. 
18. See Olson & Chapper, Screening and Tracking Criminal Appeals: The Rhode 
Island Experience, 8 JusT. Svs. J. 20 (1983). The cases subjected to summary procedures 
were the more routine cases, and they were given abbreviated briefing schedules. The 
study did not give the time to disposition for all criminal appeals in the "after" period. A 
similar problem was encountered in a study conducted by Chapper and Hanson. See 
Chapper & Hanson, Expedited Procedures for Appellate Courts: Evidence from Califor-
nia's Third District Court of Appeal, 42 Mo. L. REV. 696 (1983). The study found that 
delay in cases subjected to a procedure that gave them priority in scheduling was less 
than a similar group of cases decided the year before but not given scheduling priority. 
Id. at 720. Again, this delay reduction may well have been at the expense of other ap-
peals, but no evidence on that point was presented. 
19. E.g., A. AIKMAN, M. ELSNER & F. MILLER, supra note 10, at 92, 95-96. 
20. Casper & Brereton, Evaluating Criminal Justice Reforms, 18 LAW & Soc'v REv. 
121, 132, 138-42 (1984). 
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several courts, comparing output volume with characteristics of 
the courts. This type of research is unacceptable for several rea-
sons. First, the sample size-the number of units studied-is 
often too small to justify conclusions.21 A fifty-state sample 
would not be sufficient for a study of appellate courts, especially 
because a researcher should include a large number of variables 
to control for other differences between the states. 22 Second, the 
available variables may not capture some major differences be-
tween courts, causing misleading results. 23 Third, causal inter-
pretation is often impossible.· Because the data are taken at one 
point in time, correlations can result because the dependent 
variable (e.g., decisions per judge) affects the independent vari-
ables (factors that are thought to affect decisions per judge). A 
finding that courts with more staff attorneys are more produc-
tive, for example, cannot justify a conclusion that the larger staff 
enhances productivity; a likely alternative interpretation is that 
courts with high caseloads (and thus more decisions) per judge 
try to relieve workload pressures by hiring more staff.2• 
Numerous court studies use the case as the unit of analysis.25 
This strategy overcomes the problem of small sample size, but 
the research usually fails because almost all relationships be-
tween the dependent variable (e.g., decision output or delay), 
and procedural features of the cases are causally ambiguous. A 
finding that cases decided without published opinion are de-
cided more quickly than other cases, for example, does not mean 
that the procedure speeds opinions; more likely, cases selected 
21. Court research provides numerous examples of cross-section studies that cannot 
provide meaningful information because they use ludicrously small samples, often out-
numbered by the number of variables studied. See, e.g., Hanson & Chapper, What Does 
Sentencing Reform Do to Criminal Appeals?, 72 JUDICATURE 50 (1988) (three appellate 
courts); Martin & Prescott, The Magnitude and Sources of Delay in Ten State Appel-
late Courts, 6 JusT. SYS. J. 305 (1981). For examples at the trial level, see T. CHURCH, A. 
CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, JusTICE DELAYED (1978) (five to 21 courts); S. FLANDERS, CASE 
MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1977) (six 
courts). 
22. For example, see the variables listed in Table 1. 
23. This is illustrated by the high significance of the state effects (state dummy vari-
ables) in the regressions presented in Tables 2 and 3. The state effects represent factors 
that differ between states but are not captured by the independent variables entered 
· into the regression. 
24. For a description of this problem, see J. MARTIN & E. PRESCOTT, APPELLATE 
COURT DELAY: STRUCTURAL RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEMS OF VOLUME AND DELAY 50-51 
(1981). 
25. See, e.g., id. at 42-49. 
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for nonpublished opinions are less complex and thus are 
processed more quickly.28 
B. Acceptable Research Designs 
Social science research texts consider three research designs, if 
properly executed, to be acceptable when studying social causa-
tion. 27 These designs are the pure experiment, the single time 
series, and the multiple time series. Researchers mitigate causal 
ambiguity either by studying the impact of an innovation over 
several years or by applying the innovation to a randomly se-
lected group of courts or cases. 
1. Pure random experiment- The preferred research design 
for causal analysis is the pure experiment, where subjects (e.g., 
cases or courts) are divided randomly into control and experi-
mental groups. The "experiment" is applied to the experimental 
group, and the output measure (e.g., delay or number of deci-
sions) is compared to that in the control group. The strength of 
this design is based on the assumptions that the two groups dif-
fer systematically in only one respect, the application of the ex-
periment, and that all other differences are random. The Federal 
Judicial Center and the National Center for State Courts have 
been able to estimate the effectiveness of appellate settlement 
conferences by randomly assigning some cases to the conference 
procedure and other cases to a control group. 28 But successful 
experimental studies in courts are extremely rare because of 
26. A similar problem is involved in studies finding that fast-track procedures, which 
give scheduling priority to less complex appeals, result in quicker decisions in those ap-
peals. Such findings cannot support the conclusions that the procedures reduced delay in 
the courts because the speedier decisions may be at the expense of greater delay in other 
decisions. See Chapper & Hanson, supra note 18, at 706-70; Olson & Chapper, supra 
note 18, at 24-28. 
27. See generally D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 13-24; T. CooK & D. 
CAMPBELL, supra note 7; Lempert, supra note 7, at 127-32; Lind, Shapard & Cecil, supra 
note 7, at 91-96, 107-10. 
28. J. GOLDMAN, AN EVALUATION OF THE CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN: AN EXPER-
IMENT IN JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 8-11 (1977) (Federal Judicial Center publication); A. 
PARTRIDGE & A. LIND, A REEVALUATION OF THE CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN 31-42 
(1983) (Federal Judicial Center publication); D. STEELMAN & J. GOLDMAN, THE SETTLE-
MENT CONFERENCE: EXPERIMENTING WITH APPELLATE JUSTICE 55-58 (1986) (National 
Center for State Courts Publication). These studies, however, suffer from the problem 
that the results are peculiar to the courts studied, and judges cannot assume that settle-
ment conferences in their courts will produce similar results. Also, the conclusions 
reached can depend on the particular measure of "success" used. Compare J. GOLDMAN, 
supra, at 36-46, with Goldman, The Civil Appeals Management Plan: An Experiment 
in Appellate Procedural Reform, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 1209, 1221-22 (1978). 
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many practical problems. Judges may be reluctant to permit re-
searchers to dictate court operations to the extent required to 
ensure random assignment. The experiments require substantial 
sample sizes (typically several hundred, depending on the mag-
nitude of the impact found), so a true experiment may require 
several years. 
By far, the most important problem with pure experiments in 
court research is that the experimental and control groups may 
be treated differently in ways other than the "experimental" 
treatment, thus contaminating the results. Researchers can use 
the experimental design to determine whether appellate settle-
ment conferences foster more settlements because the confer-
ences take place in the early stages of case processing, and the 
settlement decisions are made by attorneys, not by the court. If 
aspects of court processing are controlled by judges or court 
staff, a true experiment cannot be used to evaluate them because 
the researcher cannot determine whether the judges or court 
staff decide independently of the "experimental" procedure.29 
For example, studying the impact of staff attorneys by randomly 
assigning some cases to staff and others to a control group would 
not be helpful because judges may give staff cases priority or 
otherwise treat these cases differently from the control cases. It 
would be unrealistic to expect judges to ignore the existence of 
the experiment. This problem could be avoided if the court, 
rather than the case, is the unit of analysis, but that would re-
quire an enormous research effort, using hundreds of courts with 
varying procedures randomly assigned to them. 
2. Long time series- The other generally accepted research 
designs for the social science exploration of causation are based 
on time differences between variables, and they rely heavily on 
econometric techniques. A change in court operations in one 
year can cause, but cannot be caused by, changes in the depen-
dent variable-in the present research, decision output-in sub-
sequent years. The time-series design, for example, could study 
whether output increases significantly in the years after staff at-
torneys were hired. This design differs from the discredited 
before-and-after design mainly because the data are obtained for 
enough time periods to help control for the impact of factors 
other than the evaluated change. The rule of thumb is that 
29. For example, the experimental design cannot be used to determine whether set-
tlement conferences reduce delay because other procedural hurdles and/or the priorities 
involved in scheduling conference cases may affect the scheduling of the nonconference 
cases. See A. PARTRIDGE & A. LIND, supra note 28, at 49-59; D. STEELMAN & J. GOLDMAN, 
supra note 28, at 55-91. 
424 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:3 
time-series tests require data from at least fifty time periods.30 
Such large data sets are rarely available for court studies. 31 
3. Multiple time-series design- The final acceptable design, 
and the design used here, is the multiple time-series analysis, 
which uses data from many courts over a period of several years. 
This has long been considered among the best social science re-
search designs.32 Nevertheless, the design is seldom used for 
court studies, probably because it is more the province of econo-
mists than of the disciplines whose members generally study 
courts. 
In the present study, the application of the multiple time-se-
ries design involves data for forty-four state appellate court sys-
tems over a time span of seventeen years for most. The variables 
include measures of decision output and of the changes being 
evaluated. In this way, the time series for the different court sys-
tems, each of which is not long enough for proper analysis, can 
be combined into a regression with a large sample size. 33 
The only multiple time-series study of appellate court decision 
output-in fact, the only prior study of state appellate proce-
dures other than settlement conferences that uses an acceptable 
research design-was conducted more than half a century ago. 
In this excellent, large-scale project at the University of Michi-
gan Law School, the authors counted opinions published in most 
states during the first three decades of the century and evalu-
ated efficiency measures, such as adding lawyer staff and decid-
ing cases without opinion, by determining whether opinion out-
put increased in the years after a particular measure was 
adopted by the various courts.34 The authors of that work, how-
ever, did not have the statistical techniques or computing power 
to control for the impact of other changes. The present study 
attempts to modernize that seminal project. 
30. T. CooK & D. CAMPBELL, supra note 7, at 228. 
31. For an example of a study with sufficient time series data, see Garner, Delay 
Reduction in the Federal Courts: Rule 50(b) and the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 
3 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 229 (1987). 
32. Campbell and Stanley, two highly regarded methodologists, consider this "an ex-
cellent quasi-experimental design, perhaps the best of the more feasible designs." D. 
CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 57; see also T. CooK & D. CAMPBELL, supra note 
7, at 214-18. Lempert considers this design to be the "design par excellence" for impact 
research. Lempert, supra note 7, at 130. 
33. The statistical methodology used is further described in Part II. 
34. Curran & Sunderland, The Organization and Operation of Courts of Review: An 
Examination of the Various Methods Employed to Increase the Operating Capacity 
and Efficiency of Appellate Courts, in THIRD REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MICHI-
GAN 52 (1933). 
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This Section describes the research procedures applied to the 
multiple time-series model. The section pays particular atten-
tion to the statistical methods and the construction of 
variables. 36 
A. Statistical Methods 
The present research uses a production function model and a 
fixed effects regression. Both are basic, routine statistical proce-
dures that have been used and refined for several decades. 
The production function has long been considered to be the 
best procedure for analyzing the volume of output in an organi-
zation. The production function gives the amount of output that 
can be produced by a given combination of labor and other in-
puts.36 It assumes that output increases at a decreasing rate: 
that each additional unit of labor, for example, will cause the 
output to increase, but the rate of increase will get smaller un-
less all other inputs increase proportionately. For example, ap-
plying this notion to appellate courts, one would not expect that 
simply adding more judges would result in a corresponding in-
crease in appeals decided, because the pool of cases to be de-
cided, the court's staff, and other inputs have not increased. 
Without a production function model, the researcher would 
make the unrealistic assumption that, for example, ten percent 
more judges will decide ten percent more cases, even if no more 
cases were filed or no more staff attorneys or law clerks were 
hired. 
For the regression analysis, we have used the "fixed-effects" 
model, which includes dummy variables for each state (dummy 
variables are either zero or one; here, the dummy variable for a 
35. For more detail concerning the analyses and data used, see T. Marvell & C. 
Moody, State Appellate Court Adaptation to Caseload Growth (July 1986) (unpublished 
report; National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Washington, D.C.); Responses to 
Caseload Growth, supra note 3. The full data set is available from the authors or from 
the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
36. The research uses the most common form of production function, the Cobb-
Douglas function, which has been widely used for half a century. For more detailed de-
scriptions of the Cobb-Douglas function, see M. INTRILIGATOR, ECONOMETRIC MODELS, 
TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 262-80, 288-92 (1978); A. WALTERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ECONOMETRICS 269-339 (1970). For the specific application of the Cobb-Douglas function 
to the present research (including the mathematical functions) and more detail concern-
ing the analysis and data used, see T. Marvell & C. Moody, supra note 35, at ch. 2, 1-8. 
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state is one for observations pertaining to the state, and zero 
otherwise). This, again, is standard statistical procedure.37 
B. Unit of Analysis 
State appellate court operations and productivity are best an-
alyzed at the level of the entire appellate system, rather than at 
the level of an individual court, because state appellate struc-
tures vary.38 In 1968, the initial year of the research, only seven-
teen of the forty-four states studied had intermediate appellate 
courts (IAC's). By 1984, they existed in thirty-one of the states. 
IAC jurisdiction differs greatly. In some states, IAC's receive vir-
tually all initial appeals; in others, a sizeable portion of the ap-
peals are routed directly to the state supreme court. IAC's in the 
former states, of course, are usually much larger than those in 
the latter states. A few states, moreover, have two IAC's with 
different subject-matter jurisdiction. Finally, the division of ap-
pellate jurisdiction changed substantially during the period of 
37. See R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMIC FORECASTS 
252-61 (1981); Moody & Marvell, Appellate and Trial Court Caseload Growth: A Pooled 
Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis, 3 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 143, 150-52 (1987) 
[hereinafter Cross-Section Analysis]. The multiple time-series design, it should be 
noted, is also called the time-series cross-section design, and the fixed-effects model is 
also called the "least squares dummy variable" or the "covariance" model. The fixed-
effects model also includes separate dummies for each year; these were eliminated be-
cause, as a group, they were not significant. See R. PINDYCK & D. RuBINFELD, supra, at 
255. This means that it is very likely that there are nationwide factors affecting appellate 
decision output that are not represented by the independent variables entered in the 
analysis. 
As a time-series analysis, this research occasionally encountered autocorrelation 
problems that were corrected using the normal procedure. R. PINDYCK & D. RuBINFELD, 
supra, at 258-61. The regression in Table 2 and the supreme court analysis in Table 3 
had Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.32 and 1.66, respectively, before correction (values be-
low 1.78 indicate possible autocorrelation problems). The Breusch-Pagan test uncovered 
a slight heteroskedasticity problem (the test looked at whether variance is related to 
court size and found variance is greater in small states), which was eliminated by weight-
ing the regression by the square root of population. Tests for multicollinearity (indepen-
dent variables highly correlated) revealed a possible problem with respect to the number 
of filings for the current year and the prior year. That is, the F-Ratios for these variables 
given in Tables 2 and 3 may be too low, and the apportionment of the coefficient be-
tween the two may be slightly off. The only other multicollinearity is between state dum-
mies (and between the dummies and the intercept), which is not relevant to the results 
here. Application of the Granger-Sims test found no simultaneity (independent variable 
causing independent variables), except for a possible problem with respect to the number 
of judges, discussed infra note 58. For a more complete and technical analysis of the 
application of the fixed-effects model to the present research, see T. Marvell & C. 
Moody, supra note 35, at ch. 2, 4-9. 
38. The variations are described in Marvell, supra note 5, at 90-97. 
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this study; most states have created or greatly expanded IAC's 
since 1968. 
These changes render trends in individual courts misleading 
because the content of their caseloads change. When a state 
transfers jurisdiction to an IAC from a supreme court, the su-
preme court typically retains the more difficult appeals and the 
more time-consuming lawmaking function of appellate courts, 
while the IAC concentrates on error correction. Hence, the 
caseload and procedure of a supreme court often cannot be com-
pared to those of earlier years or to those of supreme courts in 
other states. IAC operations are more comparable because all 
IAC's concentrate on error correction, but states differ concern-
ing how many of the difficult error-correcting cases are retained 
in the supreme court. 
By focusing on the whole appellate system, one can avoid the 
troubles caused by shifting jurisdiction. 39 Taken at the appellate 
level, the variables are derived by adding figures from the su-
preme courts and the IAC's in each state. For example, the num-
ber of decisions per judge is the sum of supreme court and IAC 
decisions divided by the sum of supreme court and IAC judges, 
and the percentage of opinions that are unpublished is the total 
number of unpublished opinions in the two court levels divided 
by the total number of opinions. 
As discussed later, the study also analyzed separately three 
different categories of appellate systems: (1) supreme cour~ in 
states without IAC's; (2) appellate systems that have large 
IAC's-those taking at least eighty percent of the appeals in the 
state; and (3) mid-range states, with IAC's deciding less than 
eighty percent of all appeals. Variable means presented in Table 
1 show that there are some major differences among these three 
types of appellate systems. 40 
39. See infra note 54 concerning controls when there are changes in the jurisdiction 
of the overall state appellate system, as opposed to changes in the jurisdiction of individ-
ual courts. 
40. See infra text accompanying note 47. Table 1, however, exaggerates the differ-
ences. Because many states created IAC's, data for supreme courts alone tend to be for 
earlier years in the study, when decisions per judge were lower and efficiency measures 
were less drastic. The same applies to the relationship between mid-range appellate sys-
tems and states with large IAC's. 
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C. The Dependent Variable: Number of Appeals Decided 
Per Judge· 
The two major types of variables in a regression analysis are 
the dependent and independent variables. Each regression has 
one dependent variable, placed on the left side of the equation. 
The independent variables, on the right side of the equation, are 
assumed to "cause" changes in the dependent variable.0 The 
dependent variable in this study is the number of appeals de-
cided per judge during a year, and the following paragraphs de-
fine the two elements of this term. 
1. Decisions- Appeals "decided" are those resolved on the 
merits-with or without written opinion.42 "Decisions" do not 
include denials of writs or certiorari petitions, appeals with-
drawn or dismissed for lack of progress, determinations made on 
procedural motions, or rehearing petitions. "Decisions" do in-
clude, however, cases dismissed by written opinion, disciplinary 
cases given full review, appeals summarily decided on the merits 
(e.g;, cases resolved without briefs), and certiorari petitions or 
other discretionary writs granted and then considered in the 
manner of ordinary appeals.43 
41. For detailed information about the variables and the sources of data, see T. MAR-
VELL & C. MOODY, supra note 35, at chs. 6-12. 
The major sources of data are state court administrative offices, unpublished reports 
prepared by the courts, and the large body of secondary literature on the topic, see supra 
note 5. Especially useful were several nationwide surveys of appellate court operations, 
including W. KRAMER, COMPARATIVE OUTLINE OF BASIC APPELLATE COURT STRUCTURE AND 
PROCEDURES IN THE UNITED STATES (1983), and Council of Chief Judges of Cts. of Ap-
peals, Chief Judges as Administrators: A Survey (Apr. 1984) (unpublished report) (Ap-
pellate Judges Conference of the Arn. Bar Ass'n). In several states, where all opinions are 
published, decision data were obtained by counting opinions. Court clerks were inter-
viewed in all states studied, as well as staff attorneys or judges in most states. The com-
pleted data were sent to the clerks for comments. 
42. The number of decisions for most courts is the number of cases decided, but, for 
some, it is the number of opinions or orders deciding cases. The latter measure excludes 
cases consolidated for decision in one opinion (which amount to approximately five to 
ten percent of all appeals decided). The decision measure never varies within a state; 
thus, in the regression analysis, the state dummy variables control for the difference in 
methods of counting decisions. 
43. The composition of appeals probably varies greatly between states; thus, the diffi-
culty of appeals may vary, and the number of appeals decided may not be comparable 
between states. The regression analysis, however, controls for such differences by enter-
ing state dummy variables. There is no reason to believe that the types of appeals in 
state courts have changed appreciably during the relatively short period of this study. If 
there were nationwide changes, they would be controlled for by the year dummies (which 
would then become significant). The nationwide portion of criminal appeals, which prob-
ably take less time than civil appeals, has changed little since the rnid-1960's, but the 
portion of criminal appeals did vary in individual states. See BUREAU OF JusT. STATISTICS, 
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2. Judges- The "number of judges" is the number of sit-
ting, full-time appellate judges. It excludes vacancies but in-
cludes judges temporarily absent due to illness or recusal. It ex-
cludes senior or retired judges, unless they sit full-time and are 
regular judges for all practical purposes.44 
III. RESULTS 
The analysis evaluates the effectiveness of changes that courts 
have adopted to increase decision output, emphasizing those 
that the literature has recommended as effective answers to 
caseload problems.45 In addition, the analysis includes several 
control variables to represent changes, other than efficiency 
measures, that may affect output. In all, the analysis contains 
nineteen independent variables (not including the state effects) 
that are organized into eight categories below.46 The variable 
supra note 1, at 2. We have information concerning the number of criminal cases for 
most states in the analysis; when the percentage of criminal cases was entered in the 
regression analysis, the variable was far from significant. As discussed infra note 54, the 
analysis controls for changes in caseload compensation when appellate jurisdiction 
changes. 
44. The major sources of information about judges were state court annual reports, 
state judicial directories and biographies, and the lists of judges printed in West Publish-
ing Company state reporters. 
45. For examples of the enormous body of literature available on this topic, see supra 
note 5. The analysis includes virtually all major changes appellate courts have made to 
increase output (excluding technological changes such as word-processing equipment). 
One exception is the Washington Court of Appeals motion on the merits procedure, 
under which staff attorneys make initial decisions in many cases, with further review by 
the judges available. With rare exceptions, cases were not decided under this program 
until 1985. See Green & Keyes, Motion on the Merits: An Effective Response to Appel· 
late Congestion and Delay, 70 JUDICATURE 168 (1986). Another possible exception is the 
use of specialized panels for criminal cases (in New Jersey during 1985) or for workers' 
compensation cases (Arizona since 1969 and Illinois since 1985). Only one of these 
changes occurred during the time period studied here. Another procedure designed to 
help appellate courts deal with rising caseloads is the preargument settlement confer-
ence; this was not included in the study because the primary aim of such conferences is 
to reduce the volume of cases submitted to the judges, not to increase decision output. 
"Screening" and "fast-track" procedures are not included as variables because they do 
not involve efficiency measures distinct from the variables that are included; rather, they 
are procedures for determining which cases are subjected to the various efficiency mea-
sures. Screening, as the name implies, involves decisions by the court as to which cases 
are argued, decided with opinion, or the like. Fast-track procedures apply certain effi-
ciency measures in return for scheduling priority. 
46. For background information, see Responses to Caseload Growth, supra note 3. 
For descriptions of the extent of changes made by each state studied, see T. MARVELL & 
C. Mooov, supra note 35, at Pt. IV, and Responses to Caseload Growth, supra note 3. 
This Article does not fully describe the numerous arguments as to why these various 
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means are given in Table 1.47 Table 2 presents the results of the 
estimation for the full sample, and Table 3 presents the results 
for three separate categories of states.48 The three are discussed 
separately because statistical tests revealed significant differ-
ences among the production functions for the different catego-
ries of states.49 However, because the differences are not major 
and do not affect most variables, discussion will concentrate on 
full analysis in Table 2, which has more observations and, there-
fore, more precise results. 
changes may or may not add to court productivity. For sources discussing this point, see 
supra note 5. 
47. As indicated in Table 2, several variables were entered in the analysis in logged 
form. The mean of the (natural) log of these variables (for all states, states without 
IAC's, mid-range states, and states with large IAC's) is: decisions per judge (4.07, 3.79, 
4.06, 4.50); filings per judge (4.42, 4.19, 4.34, 4.82); number of judges (2.48, 1.71, 2.83, 
3.32); staff attorneys per judge (.21, .15, .16, .42); law clerks per judge (.79, .76, .76, .87). 
For the number of staff attorneys and law clerks per judge, one is added to the variables 
before taking the log because it is impossible to take the log of zero, and adding one sets 
the lower limit of the logged variable at zero. 
48. See supra text accompanying note 40. The 80% level was selected because it is a 
natural break: States did not move through that level without jurisdiction changes. 
These regressions, as we previously explained, encompass whole appellate systems. The 
results of the regression for states with large IAC's are nearly the same as the results for 
the IAC's alone (that is, without including the supreme court judges, decisions, and so 
on). A similar comparison for mid-range states is not feasible because the jurisdictions of 
the supreme courts and IAC's shift widely and because, in some states, total filings, the 
most important variable, cannot be meaningfully apportioned to either court level. 
49. The Chow test was used to determine whether the results for each of the three 
types of appellate systems are significantly different from the remainder of the courts. 
See R. PINDYCK & D. RuBINFELD, supra note 37, at 123-26. Under the Chow procedure 
the analysis represented in Table 2 was conducted three times, each testing 1) whether 
the results for states with one type of appellate system are significantly different from 
the results for the remaining states with respect to each of the variables; and 2) whether 
the coefficients as a group are significantly different (excluding the IAC percentage varia-
ble, which defines the groups of states). The latter test showed significant differences, 
although the differences were not greatly significant, for all three types of court systems. 
The F-Ratios are 2.62 for supreme courts in states without IAC's, 1.96 for mid-range 
appellate systems, and 1.83 for states with large IAC's. 
With respect to individual variables, significant differences (to the .05 level) were 
found for the number of judges (mid-range and large IAC's), extra judges (supreme 
courts without IAC's and mid-range systems), intermediate court percent (mid-range 
and large IAC's), panel size (mid-range IAC's), argument length (supreme courts), and 
law clerks (supreme courts). 
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Table 1. Variable Means 
Independent Variable All States Mid- States 
Variable States with- range with 
out States large 
IAC IACs 
decisions per judge 58.56 44.26 57.97 90.02 
filings per judge 83.10 66.02 76.71 123.97 
prior year filings per judge 76.71 61.56 70.11 115.58 
number of judges 11.94 5.53 16.95 27.66 
extra judges (dummy) .26 .23 .19 .40 
percent new judges 11.45 9.57 14.18 10.60 
staff attorneys per judge .23 .16 .17 .52 
law clerks per judge 1.20 1.14 1.14 1.39 
percent unpublished opinions 22.04 9.35 22.89 39.94 
15% memo opinions (dummy) .44 .36 .41 .64 
50% memo opinions (dummy) .15 .10 .15 .30 
percent decided without opinions 8.58 9.41 4.74 11.06 
intermediate court percent 42.61 0 61.46 90.57 
average panel size 4.30 4.86 4.15 3.53 
15% w/o oral argument (dummy) .59 .42 .65 .79 
50% w/o oral argument (dummy) .19 .10 .30 .19 
oral argument length (minutes) 59.58 64.23 58.22 55.16 
10% summary decisions (dummy) .07 .12 .07 .02 
jurisdiction change (dummy) .05 0 .09 .05 
change in procedure for docketing 1.92 1.83 2.27 1.74 
filings 
The regression includes forty-four states, with five to seventeen years 
for each.110 Missing data for some independent variables, especially fil-
ings, preclude the use of all observations with data for decision output. 
Still, all but four states have complete data for at least ten years in the 
main analysis (Table 2). In the analysis of the three appellate system 
types (Table 3), nearly half the states have time series of under ten 
years because jurisdiction changes caused many states to be shifted 
from one category to another.111 The results are robust in that they do 
not change substantially when using different variable specifications or 
50. The District of Columbia is counted as a state. The states not included in the 
analysis are Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Vir-
ginia. Decision data from 1968 to 1984 were obtained for 38 of the 44 states, and decision 
data back to at least 1972 were obtained for the remaining six states. 
51. States were deleted from these analyses if they had less than five years of data. 
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regression models.02 It is important to note that the state dummies in 
all regressions are highly significant, which suggests that productivity 
differs greatly between state appellate systems (but not over time 
within statesu) for reasons not represented by other variables in the 
analysis. One possible reason might be a disparity in how hard judges 
work. 
The following sections briefly describe the independent variablesH 
52. The results for different types of analysis are given in T. Marvell & C. Moody, 
supra note 35, at chs. 14-15. That study, however, differs from the present one in that it 
does not include four states added afterwards, does not distinguish between staff attor-
neys and law clerks, does not include current-year filings, and does not correct for heter-
oskedasticity. Of particular importance is the fact that the results are very similar when 
using a linear regression, without using logged variables. Although this procedure is more 
intuitively appealing to the layperson, it is not the best procedure for reasons given in 
Part IIA. The results of this linear regression are: 
Independent Variable Coefficient T-ratio 
filings per judge .086 3.07 
prior year filing per judge .381 12.41 
extra judges (dummy) 4.004 2.23 
percent new judges -.016 .70 
staff attorneys per judge 3.771 1.14 
law clerks per judge 1.594 .93 
percent unpublished opinions .181 3.81 
15% memo opinions (dummy) .571 .39 
50% memo opinions (dummy) 3.095 1.58 
percent decided without opinions .327 4.92 
intermediate court percent .246 5.78 
average panel size 1.004 1.22 
15% w/o oral argument (dummy) .004 .00 
50% oral argument (dummy) 6.550 3.92 
oral argument length .094 1.51 
10% summary decisions (dummy) .634 .24 
jurisdiction change (dummy) -2.630 .82 
change in procedure for docketing filings .083 3.76 
Number of observations, 541; degrees of freedom, 479; F-Ratio, 791; Durbin-Watson 
statistic, 2.08 (1.64 before correction); F-Ratio for state dummies, 32.00. 
C 
53. See supra note 37 for a discussion of year dummies. 
54. Besides the variables of interest, the regression includes several "nuisance" vari-
ables that control for jurisdiction changes and changes in procedures for counting ap-
peals. During the period of the study, new laws in six states provided for direct appeal to 
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and discuss the results presented in Tables 2 and 3.55 
1. Filings- The "raw material" input is measured by two vari-
ables, the number of appeals filed per judge for the current year and 
for the prior year. This input includes a lagged variable because the 
typical court takes approximately a year to decide cases. The current 
year variable is included because a larger backlog of pending cases may 
prompt judges to expand output. Filings are appeals of right and, with 
rare exceptions, do not include writs and certiorari petitions, which are 
ordinarily dismissed without decision on the merits.56 
The results show a very strong relationship between filings, espe-
cially the previous year's filings, and decision output. Ten percent 
more filings will lead to approximately six percent more decisions,57 
even if the court makes none of the other changes studied. In other 
words, courts hand down more decisions simply because more cases are 
filed. Similar results occur in all three types of court systems. 
appellate courts from limited jurisdiction courts (previously, these appeals went to gen-
eral jurisdiction trial courts). The new laws generally cover criminal misdemeanors and 
small civil cases. Because these cases are probably less complex than most appeals, their 
addition can cause total productivity to rise. The changes occurred when intermediate 
appellate courts were created or expanded. Thus, analysis without this control variable 
would overstate the impact of IAC's on productivity. 
The second nuisance variable controls for changes in methods of counting appeals 
filed. Some courts count appeals when the notice of appeal is filed, while others count 
them when the record arrives. The latter system reduces the volume of appeals because 
many cases are dropped between notice of appeal and record completion. Six of the 
states studied adopted the first counting system during the study period, artificially in-
creasing filings. To control for this, the analysis includes an interaction variable-filings 
per judge logged times a dummy variable indicating the type of docketing (0 = when the 
record arrives; 1 = at notice of appeal). 
55. Readers not familiar with statistical analysis should note that the findings are, to 
varying degrees, imprecise. It is likely that the impact of some changes varies between 
courts, and the results here estimate the average impact. In general, a finding that a 
change shows no statistically significant impact on decision output indicates that it is 
unlikely that the change has more than slight impact in any courts, although this conclu-
sion is less clear when the degrees of freedom are less (e.g., in Table 3). When a relation-
ship is significant, the coefficient indicates the midpoint of a range in which the actual 
results are likely to fall. This range is larger when the T-Ratio is smaller. For example, 
the range (95% confidence interval) for law clerks in Table 1 is between .009 and .207 (or 
plus or minus 92% of the .108 coefficient), indicating that the findings are very impre-
cise. In contrast, the range for prior year filings per judge is .363 to .525, a spread of plus 
or minus 18%. The differences between results in Table 2 and Table 3 are due largely to 
the general impreciseness of the findings, especially those in Table 3. It would be risky to 
attribute the different results for different court systems (in Table 3) to actual differ-
ences between courts unless there are strong reasons for believing that such relationships 
exist. 
56. The filing data were obtained from a Bureau of Justice Statistics study. See Bu-
REAU OF JusT. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 4-6. 
57. In statistical terms, the "elasticity" is .6. Elasticity is the same as the coefficient 
when both variables are logged. More exactly, the elasticity for filings is the sum of the 
value for the current and prior year (.180 + .444 = .624). 
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2. Judges- Three variables pertain to judges. First, the number of 
appellate judges is a variable that indicates returns to scale-that is, 
whether adding more judges produces a corresponding increase in out-
put. If the coefficient is significantly different from zero, then the re-
turns to scale are significantly different from unitary. Taken overall, as 
shown in Table 2, there are no positive or negative returns to scale,118 
but the result differs among court systems (Table 3). For states with-
out IAC's, there are decreasing returns to scale, although at a low sig-
nificance level. Here, a one hundred percent increase in supreme court 
judges, legal staff, and filings will probably result in less than a one 
hundred percent increase in output. This result makes intuitive sense: 
the need for all judges to participate in important decisions at the top 
level poses greater problems than found in other courts. 119 
Second, the number-of-extra-judges variable refers to the temporary 
assignment of trial judges or retired judges to supplement regular judi-
cial capacity.6° Courts in most states used this practice at one time or 
another, but the courts seldom used extra judges to increase the effec-
tive number of judges by more than ten percent. Because statistics on 
the precise number of extra judges are not always available, a dummy 
variable61 signifies whether extra judges were used. 
58. Applications of the Granger-Sims test found a possible simultaneity (reverse cau-
sation) problem with respect to the number of judges. That is, if a state appellate system 
produces more (less) decisions per judge in a particular year, the state government may 
be more (less) reluctant to increase the number of judges that year. For a general discus-
sion of this type of problem, see Granger, Investigating Causal Relations by 
Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral Methods, 37 ECONOMETRICA 424 (1969). In 
practice, such a relationship is unlikely. First, the simultaneity effect is not highly signif-
icant (T-Ratio = 2.30, just above 1.96, which indicates significance to the .95 level), and 
with 16 tests for the different independent variables, one would expect that, just by 
chance, one would produce significant results. Second, common sense suggests that the 
causal relationship is improbable. Legislatures may well be less likely to create new ap-
pellate judgeships if the courts are able to handle the current caseload by increasing 
productivity, but the impact would be lagged rather than simultaneous. There is consid-
erable time between a change in productivity and any impact on the number of judges, 
because it takes a while for legislatures to react to the changes, for the law to reach its 
effective date, and for new judges to be appointed or elected. 
59. See Dethmers, Delay in State Courts of Last Resort, 328 ANNALS 153, 158 (1960). 
60. This should be distinguished from the more common practice of using trial and 
retired judges to fill in when regular judges are temporarily unavailable. 
61. Dummy variables are either zero or one. In this situation, the variable is zero if 
the appellate system does not use extra judges in a particular year, and one if it does. 
The coefficient of the dummy variable is determined solely by within-state changes. For 
the extra-judge dummy variable, there were 18 such changes in the analysis for Table 2, 
and, in Table 3 there were 10 changes for states without IAC's and seven for mid-range 
states. There was only one change for states with large IAC's, so the results are particu-
larly uncertain. Of the 44 states in the analysis, 41 have data on the judge equivalents 
added by using extra judges. In an analysis (comparable to that in Table 2) with just 
these states, the coefficient (elasticity) of the extra judge variable is .66 (T-Ratio = 3.34). 
Because the coefficient is less than one, this suggests that extra judges do not contribute 
as much as regular judges to decision output for a given amount of judge time. 
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Table 2. Regression Analysis of All States 
Dependent Variable: decisions per judge (logged) 
Independent Variable 
filings per judge (logged) 
prior year filings per judge (logged) 
judges (logged) 
extra judges (dummy) 
percent new judges 
staff attorneys per judge (logged) 
law clerks per judge (logged) 
percent unpublished opinions 
15% memo opinions (dummy) 
50% memo opinions (dummy) 
percent without opinions 
intermediate court percent 
average panel size 
15% w/o oral argument (dummy) 
50% w/o oral argument (dummy) 
oral argument length 
10% summary decisions (dummy) 
juris. change (dummy) 
change in procedure for docketing filings 
Observations 
Degrees of freedom 
F Ratio 
DW 
F Ratio for state dummies 
Coefficient 
.1808 
.4448 
-.018 
.059C 
-.00Q7C 
-.001 
.108C 
.00268 
.016 
.045d 
.00408 
.00288 
.005 
.04od 
.036 
.001 
.000 
.042 
T-ratio 
4.38 
10.87 
.37 
2.50 
2.39 
.01 
2.15 
4.18 
.82 
1.77 
4.87 
4.10 
.43 
1.82 
1.55 
.91 
.01 
.95 
.015c 2.02 
541 
478 
2838 
2.04 
16.1 
Notes: a - significant to the .0001 level; b - to the .01 level; c -
to the .05 level; d - to the .10 level. 
Table :t Regression Analysis, Different Types of Appellate Systems ~ i::.:i 
Dependent Variable: decisions per judge (logged) O') 
Independent Variable Coefficients (and T-Ratios) 
Supreme Courts Mid-Range States with 
(states without IACs) Appellate Systems Large IACs 
filings per judge (logged) .148c (2.06) .3158 (4.14) .21:ih (2.70) 
prior year filings per judge (logged) 
.429d (6.09) .4258 (4.91) .4268 (4.92) judges (logged) -.211 (1.71) -.076 (.74) -.056 (.70) 
extra judges (dummy) .146b (3.71) .005 (.15) .06:l (1.47) 
percent new judges -.0008 (1.14) -.0009d (1.66) -.ooo:i (.51) ~ 0 
staff attorneys per judge (logged) -.036 (.40) .135 (.94) .244c (2.lS) i:: 0-j 
law clerks per judge (logged) .053 (.75) .222c (2.29) .17:l (J.:l4) ::s I» 
percent unpublished opinions .007la (4.52) .0002 (.19) .0012 (1.18) 
-
15% memo opinions (dummy) .015 (.46) -.024 .009 c:m) 0 (.51) .... 
50% memo opinions (dummy) -.035 (.43) .038 (1.12) .0S8 (1.42) ~ I» 
percent decided without opinions .0033d (1.85) .0063b (3.00) .0017 (1.38) ~ 
intermediate court percent - - .0015 (1.32) .009:lc (2.SI) ::ti CD 
average panel size -.026 (.54) .016 (1.26) .01>:f (2.19) o' 0-j 
15% w/o oral argument (dummy) .121 b (3.04) -.014 (.36) .020 (.fi7) i3 
50% w/o oral argument (dummy) .003 (.07) .240b (2.71) .027 (.8fi) 
oral argument length -.001 (1.21) .000 (.38) .00:l (.7:l) 
10% sumary dee. (dummy) -.019 (.42) -.236c (2.15) .J06C (2.21) 
juris. change (dummy) 
- -
-.026 (.35) -.lfi7c (2.fi6) 
change docketing filings .035c (1.99) -.141d (1.76) .ornd (1.92) 
Number of observations 220 151 lfi4 
Degrees of freedom 184 115 121 < F Ratio 1419 98 221 
Durbin Watson statistic 1.96 2.09 1.80 0 r 
F Ratio for state dummies 10.87 8.42 1:t34 t-:> 
.... 
Notes: a - significant to the .0001 level; b - to the .01 level; c - to the .05 level; d - to the .IO level. ~ 
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The use of extra judges is significant in the overall analysis (Ta-
ble 2). In the disaggregated analyses, however, it is significant 
only in states without IAC's, possibly because in these states, 
the use of temporary judges provides a greater proportional ad-
dition to existing judicial resources. 
Third, the rate of judge turnover is expressed by the percent-
age of judges who are new to the court in the year studied.62 
This variable was included because new judges may be less pro-
ductive than experienced judges. The percent-new-judges varia-
ble has a significant negative impact on productivity, as ex-
pected, but the magnitude is very small. 
3. Legal staff- The legal staff consists of staff attorneys and 
the judges' personal law clerks. The former work for the whole 
court, and the latter work for individual judges.63 Here, as else-
where, the variables are for the whole appellate system; law 
clerks per judge, for example, are the total number of appellate 
law clerks in the state divided by the total number of judges on 
the supreme court and IAC (Table 2). 
Adding more staff attorneys and law clerks has surprisingly 
little impact on decisions. For law clerks, the impact is signifi-
cant in the overall analysis, but the magnitude is small. The co-
efficient of .108 means that if a second law clerk is given to each 
judge, the decision output per judge would increase by only 
some ten percent.64 The nationwide analysis in Table 2 found 
that staff attorneys have no impact on decision output. Table 3, 
however, suggests that staff attorneys may increase productivity 
in large IAC's. Because the significance level is low, this is far 
from certain, but it is quite possible that judges in large IAC's 
are more likely to delegate decision tasks to the staff. 
Although the data provide no explanation for the meager im-
pact of legal staff on productivity, one can speculate that the 
62. More precisely, it is the number of new judges in the last month of the prior year 
and the first 11 months of the current year, divided by the total number of judges. The 
variable is lagged a month because it usually takes at least one month for the work of a 
new judge to appear as decision output. 
63. Information about attorney aides, more than other variables, came from second-
ary sources and from interviews with court personnel. In several states, court staff them-
selves obtained the data from budget statements for the study. 
64. This is a very imprecise estimate because the significance level is low. The analy-
sis without logged variables found that law clerks did not have a significant impact. See 
supra note 52. A similar result was recently obtained in a regression analysis of United 
States Supreme Court productivity; the authors found that adding law clerks had a 
slight negatiue impact on opinion output in the period 1948-1985, which they attributed 
to the administrative costs of managing a larger staff. Stewart & Heck, Caseloads and 
Controuersies: A Different Perspectiue on the "Ouerburdened" U.S. Supreme Court, 12 
JusT. Svs. J. 370, 378-379 (1987). 
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tasks performed by the staff often add to the work of the judges. 
For example, a major responsibility of the staff is to gather legal 
authorities and other information,65 thus adding to the amount 
of material for the judges to consider. If this is true, attorney 
staff increase the quality, more than the quantity, of decisions. 
The present research, of course, does not address issues of 
quality. 
4. Opinion practices- The analysis includes variables per-
taining to three types of opinion practices, all of which can in-
crease productivity because they reduce the amount of time that 
judges spend writing opinions. The first is the percentage of 
cases decided with unpublished opinions-that is, with opinions 
written but not published in the official reports or in the West 
regional reports.66 This is an effective efficiency measure. Reduc-
ing opinion publication has a highly significant impact, although 
possibly greater in states without IAC's. 
The second practice is issuing opinions that are not signed by 
the authoring judge. These are typically called per curiam, mem-
orandum, or simply "memo" opinions-the latter term is used 
here to ref er to all unsigned opinions. The use of memo opinions 
represents a crude measure of opinion length. Most are much 
shorter than regular signed opinions, but several courts issue 
lengthy memo opinions, and a few courts issue very short signed 
opinions. Because some courts do not issue statistics on the ac-
tual number of memo opinions, their use is expressed in dummy 
variables: One signifies whether memo opinions constitute fif-
teen percent or more of the total number of opinions, and a sec-
ond signifies whether they constitute at least half the opinions.67 
The analysis found that issuing memo opinions has only a small 
impact, slightly significant for one of the variables in Table 2, 
but never significant in Table 3.68 However, the analysis might 
65. T. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING IN THE 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 88-97 (1978). 
66. Information for this variable was usually available from court statistics, and it 
was checked against figures supplied by West Publishing Company for the number of 
opinions it published for each court in each year. For several states, the West figures 
were the only information available concerning the extent of publication. 
67. Dummy variables here and elsewhere were "smoothed" in the sense that they 
were not changed if the court only temporarily and slightly passed the dividing line. 
68. There were 30 within-state changes in the 15% dummy variable in Table 2, and 
13 for the 50% dummy variable. Comparable figures for Table 3 are 11 and three for 
supreme courts without IAC's, 10 and five for mid-range states, and five and three for 
states with large IAC's. Some changes are not included in Table 3 because they occurred 
when appellate systems changed categories. Information about the number of memo 
opinions was obtained for 37 of the 44 states. In an analysis with only these states, the 
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have shown a greater impact if a more refined measure of opin-
ion length were available. 
The final opinion variable is the percentage of appeals decided 
without any opinion. These are decisions on the merits (denials 
of discretionary appeals and writs are excluded in the measure 
of decisions) that are decided by a simple order giving only the 
bare holding. Deciding cases without opinion greatly increases 
productivity (Table 2). The results in Table 3 suggest that the 
most pronounced impact may occur in mid-range appellate sys-
tems, although there is no ready explanation for why this might 
be so. 
5. Intermediate courts- Because IAC jurisdiction-and 
therefore the portion of cases decided by IAC's and supreme 
courts-varies greatly, IAC's are measured by the percentage of 
appellate system decisions made there. The percentage, of 
course, is zero in states without IAC's, and it varies from fifty to 
ninety-five percent for nearly all states with IAC's. The IAC 
variable is significant for the overall regression (Table 2).69 This 
means that increasing IAC jurisdiction increases the overall pro-
ductivity of state appellate systems even after controlling for all 
the other changes studied here. 
6. Panel decisions- With few exceptions, IAC's either have 
only three judges or they decide cases in panels of three judges. 
Most supreme courts sat in panels of three to five judges at some 
time during the study. One would expect that the involvement 
of fewer judges in decisions would increase productivity. In the 
analysis, the average size of panels is the mean number of judges 
deciding cases. If a court decides all cases en bane (i.e., without 
using panels), the panel size is considered to be the total number 
of judges on the court. The average panel size for states with 
IAC's is computed from the panel sizes for the supreme court 
and IAC, weighted for the relative decision output of each. 
Perhaps the most surprising finding in this research is that 
reducing panel size does not increase productivity. 70 A possible 
explanation is that the judge assigned to write the opinion does 
most of the work on an appeal, and smaller panels do not reduce 
percent of cases decided with memo opinions was significantly related to decision output 
(coefficient = .0016, T-Ratio = 2.03). 
69. This result cannot be compared to those in Table 3 because the extent of IAC 
involvement in producing appellate decisions is the criterion for distinguishing the three 
types of appellate systems. The results in Table 3, therefore, do not reflect the impact of 
major changes in IAC use. 
70. These results, like all the findings here, apply only within the range experienced 
by the courts studied. The average panel size is almost always limited to the three to 
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opinion assignments or, probably, the amount of time required 
to write opinions. 71 Furthermore, each concurring judge may 
scrutinize the opinion more carefully when the panel is small, 
knowing that there are fewer judges who can do so. 
7. Oral arguments- Oral arguments can be curtailed by re-
ducing their frequency or their length. The available informa-
tion permits only rather crude variables for both. The number of 
arguments is represented by two dummy variables signifying 
whether at least fifteen percent and fifty percent, respectively, of 
the cases are decided without argument. The length of argu-
ments is represented by the time limit specified in court rules, 
but this only approximates the actual time spent because many 
attorneys do not use their allotted time. 
Reducing the percentage of cases argued produces a signifi-
cant impact on productivity,72 although the results differ some-
what between appellate systems (Table 3). The oral argument 
time limits have no discernible impact on productivity. 
8. Summary judgment procedures- Summary judgment 
procedures, the most radical answer to caseload growth, are sim-
ilar to such procedures at the trial level. The court or one party 
moves to affirm before the parties file their briefs (in some 
courts, even before the transcript is filed), and the information 
received by the court is usually limited to short memoranda 
from the parties. When the appeal is summarily decided, there-
fore, the court dispenses with most of the appellate process. 
These procedures are represented by a dummy variable that in-
dicates whether at least ten percent of the cases are decided 
with summary judgment procedures. In 1984, appellate systems 
of seven states decided from ten to fifty percent of their appeals 
in this manner. 
seven range, and the research findings, of course, do not imply that large IAC's would 
maintain current levels of efficiency if they sat en bane. 
Here again, Table 2 cannot be compared to Table 3 because the greatest changes in 
panel size tend to occur when IAC's are created or greatly expanded. 
71. Perhaps, however, opinions take longer to write when there are larger panels be-
cause the opinion author must try to incorporate more views. Larger panels may also 
provide more opportunity for dissenting opinions. But these concerns probably affect 
only a small minority of a state's appeals, where the issues lend themselves to divergent 
views. 
72. There were 24 within-state changes in the 15% dummy variable in Table 2, and 
13 for the 50% dummy variable. Comparable figures for Table 3 are nine and five for 
supreme courts without IAC's, 10 and five for mid-range states, and four and three for 
states with large IAC's. Statistics for the percentage of cases argued are available for 30 
of the 44 states. A regression containing only these states showed that the percentage of 
cases argued had a significant impact on productivity (coefficient =. -.0025, T-Ratio = 
4.00). 
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In the overall regression (Table 2), this variable shows no im-
pact on output. The same result was obtained in Table 3 for 
supreme courts (five of which adopted summary judgment pro-
cedures). The final two analyses show barely significant impacts, 
in opposite directions. These results, however, are incomplete 
because each analysis contained only one state that adopted 
summary judgment procedures. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The volume of decisions by state appellate courts has grown 
dramatically, as has the judges' productivity. Exploring the rea-
sons for this growth is difficult because numerous interacting 
factors influence output and productivity. This research uses the 
only feasible research design for such a task, the multiple time-
series design. 
The analysis found that changes intended to increase appel-
late court productivity usually have that effect, although the im-
pact is often not substantial. Importantly, the study found that 
adding judges ordinarily produces a corresponding increase in 
the number of appeals decided (provided, of course, that filings 
also increase). Supreme courts, however, may exhibit slight "de-
clining returns to scale." Assigning temporary judges to appel-
late courts also helps increase the volume of appeals decided. 
The most effective procedural changes are those that reduce 
the burden of writing and publishing opinions. Deciding cases 
without opinion greatly increases court output, and reducing the 
number of opinions published has a lesser, but still substantial, 
impact. Issuing unsigned memorandum or per curium opinions, 
rather than full signed opinions, has but a slight impact. 
Reducing the number of cases argued also has a moderate im-
pact on productivity. In conducting our research, we were not 
able to gather information concerning the actual length of oral 
arguments, but we determined that rule changes that reduce 
time limits for arguments have no impact. 
The fact that curtailing opinion writing and publication, and 
limiting arguments increase appellate court efficiency does not, 
of course, automatically lead to a recommendation that these 
practices be adopted. Many have argued that such changes re-
duce the quality of justice provided by the courts. The present 
research looks only at the impact of changes on the number of 
cases decided per judge. Before judges or others can apply these 
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findings, they must factor in their feelings about the potential 
impact on the quality of appellate justice. 
The act of creating intermediate courts, or expanding their ju-
risdiction, in itself increases the productivity of the entire appel-
late system. This occurs even after controlling for contempora-
neous changes, such as adding judges, using three-judge panels, 
and routing minor appeals to the appellate courts rather than to 
general jurisdiction trial courts. 
Changes found to have very little or no impact include reduc-
ing panel size, adopting summary procedures, and adding staff 
attorneys. Adding law clerks has a small impact. Appellate 
courts commonly make these changes in the belief that they will 
help them cope with the rising caseloads. The research here sug-
gests otherwise, and judges are advised to consider other 
changes, especially reducing arguments and full opinions, when 
desiring to increase productivity. There are, however, reasons for 
making changes other than productivity concerns-changes that 
are beyond the scope of this research. For example, law clerks 
and staff attorneys may well increase the quality of information 
used by judges when making decisions. 
When all is said and done, the greatest determinant of the 
number of decisions is the number of filings. Caseload pressures 
are by far the most important stimulus increasing productivity, 
and the great increase in decision output and productivity of ap-
pellate courts in recent decades is largely due to an equally great 
increase in appeals filed. The implication is that when caseloads 
rise, judges either work harder or reduce the amount of atten-
tion given each case in ways not measured here, such as by 
spending less time reading briefs and transcripts. On the other 
hand, filing growth does not lead to a one-to-one growth in deci-
sions; for example, a ten percent filing increase typically stimu-
lates about six percent more decisions. Therefore, unless more 
judges are added or efficiency measures adopted, the average ap-
pellate court will soon fall hopelessly behind. 
